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Background 
 
The context for this work derives from NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 
(ARMD), working as a member agency of the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO), to provide foundational research supporting the development of “The Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)”. NextGen refers to “a wide-ranging 
initiative to transform the air traffic control system”1 according to the JPDO, which 
includes among its principal member agencies, both NASA and the FAA. The JPDO is 
charged to “. . . . create, and carry out an integrated plan for NextGen, spearhead planning, 
and coordinate research, demonstrations and development in conjunction with relevant 
programs of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector.”2 Accordingly, 
safely increasing the capacity of the National Airspace System (NAS) to accommodate up 
to three times current levels of flight demand are a primary objective of the JPDO in the 
development of NextGen. 
 
Prior to the JPDO’s establishment in 2003, NASA-Aeronautics began developing a far-
term, transformational concept called Distributed Air/Ground-Traffic Management (DAG-
TM), which pursued many of the same objectives. Under DAG-TM, NAS users would 
share information, collaborate on decision-making and distribute decision authority to the 
most appropriate decision maker, with the goal of improving system capacity as well as 
increasing flexibility and efficiency. 
 
Following the completion of DAG-TM in September of 2004, NASA’s Aeronautics 
Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) comprehensively re-planned its research 
investments. This resulted in the establishment of two projects within the new Airspace 
Systems Program (ASP), the NextGen Airspace and NextGen Airportal Projects. Both 
projects support the JPDO in the course of developing NextGen.  
 
This study is Task 49 of the System-Level Design Analysis and Simulation Tools 
(SLDAST) Research Focus Area (RFA) of the NASA Airspace Project. 
 
                                                 
1  From JPDO website: http://www.jpdo.gov/faq.asp#31 under  “What is NextGen?”  
 
2  From JPDO website: http://www.jpdo.gov/faq.asp#3 under  “What does the Joint Planning and 
Development Office do?”  
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Introduction 
This report presents the results from a study that investigates the performance of a tactical 
Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) in en route airspace, under varying 
demand levels, with realistic traffic flows. The ASAS concept studied here allows flight 
crews of equipped aircraft to perform separation from other air traffic autonomously.  
 
This study addresses the tactical aspects of an ASAS using aircraft state data (i.e. position 
and velocity) to detect and resolve projected conflicts. In addition, use of a conflict 
prevention system helps ASAS-equipped aircraft avoid maneuvers that may cause new 
conflicts. ASAS-capable aircraft are equipped with satellite-based navigation and 
Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) for transmission and receipt of 
aircraft state data. 
 
In addition to tactical conflict detection and resolution (CD&R), a complete, integrated 
ASAS is likely to incorporate a strategic CD&R component with a longer look-ahead time, 
using trajectory intent information. A system-wide traffic flow management (TFM) 
component, located at the FAA command center helps aircraft to avoid regions of 
excessive traffic density and complexity. A Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS), as used today is the system of last resort. This integrated approach avoids sole 
reliance on the use of the tactical CD&R studied here, but the tactical component remains a 
critical element of the complete ASAS.  
 
The focus of this study is to determine to what extent the proposed tactical component of 
ASAS alone can maintain aircraft separation at demand levels up to three times that of 
current traffic. The study also investigates the effect of mixing ASAS-equipped aircraft 
with unequipped aircraft (i.e. current day) that do not have the capability to self-separate. 
Position and velocity data for unequipped aircraft need to be available to ASAS-equipped 
aircraft. Most likely, for this future concept, state data would be available from instrument 
flight rules (IFR) aircraft, equipped with at least ADS-B transmission capability. 
 
The objective is to reduce the number of losses of separation to a minimum and investigate 
the limits of tactical-only CD&R. Thus, the objective is not, expressly, to achieve zero 
losses of separation with tactical ASAS because this is one component of an integrated 
ASAS.  
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Concept Outline 
The ASAS concept analyzed here has the potential to allow the flight crew of equipped 
aircraft to assume responsibility for separation during the en route phase of flight. This can 
potentially increase airspace capacity that today is primarily limited by the workload 
constraints of air traffic controllers.  
 
The concept may also increase the flow of traffic through an airport by enabling aircraft to 
meet a required time of arrival (RTA) at the arrival fix. Accurately meeting an RTA evens 
out traffic flow and reduces spacing uncertainty. The capability to meet an RTA is a key 
element of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) trajectory-based 
operations (TBO) concept, as defined in the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO) concept of operations (CONOPS) [1].  
 
In addition to capacity gains, ASAS may also increase the efficiency of flight by allowing 
more direct routing compared with the routes in use today. Airlines and flight crews gain 
flexibility to modify routes during flight while remaining within NAS constraints.  
 
The ASAS concept directly addresses transition path issues between today’s IFR 
operations to a future state where IFR traffic safely inter-operates with self-separating 
ASAS operations. 
 
The concept investigated in this study makes use of an automated, flight-deck based 
system for CD&R, combined with a conflict prevention system to prevent aircraft 
maneuvers from creating new conflicts. The KB3D [2] algorithm was used for tactical 
CD&R, combined with a conflict prevention system known as Predictive-ASAS (P-ASAS) 
[3]. This combination is referred to as Tactical ASAS in this report.  
 
Upon detection of a potential conflict, a flight-deck display indicates one or more possible 
resolution maneuvers to the pilot. The P-ASAS provides information that the pilot can use 
to avoid additional, secondary conflicts (e.g. within the ensuing 3 minutes). Therefore, the 
pilot makes the final selection of maneuver.  
 
ASAS aircraft are equipped with a Flight Management System (FMS) with the capability 
to meet an RTA. This FMS enables the aircraft to meet flow-management constraints. 
These constraints may include required time and position of airspace-region crossing 
points and required arrival time at an airport arrival fix. 
 
Thus, using ASAS, in properly equipped aircraft, trained crews can assume responsibility 
for traffic separation. Such crews would be free to modify their flight path in real time, 
without approval from an air traffic controller as long as the trajectory meets all flow-
management constraints. 
 
The concept necessitates that self-separating flights operate under a new set of flight rules 
called autonomous flight rules (AFR). The AFR flights are required to maintain separation 
from all other aircraft. Using a set of priority rules (described in the Simulation Setup 
section), one aircraft in the pair in conflict is required to maneuver first, with the other 
aircraft maneuvering if the situation becomes urgent. 
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In a mixed equipage environment, AFR aircraft are also required to maintain separation 
from aircraft operating under IFR and must give priority to such aircraft. Air traffic 
controllers would issue flow-management constraints to all aircraft and continue to provide 
separation among IFR aircraft, accommodating those operators who choose not to equip 
for AFR. In all likelihood, controllers would need to be aware of the presence of AFR 
aircraft and avoid maneuvering IFR aircraft into short-term conflicts with AFR. However, 
controller actions in a mixed equipage environment are not within the scope of this study. 
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Research Objectives  
The main objectives of this research are to:  
 
1. Investigate the extent that Tactical ASAS alone can accommodate current demand 
levels, while efficiently resolving conflicts. 
 
2. Investigate the performance of Tactical ASAS alone as demand levels increase to 
twice and three times current demand levels. 
 
3. Investigate the integration of ASAS equipped aircraft with non-equipped aircraft in 
non-segregated airspace. 
 
4. Investigate the extent that existing modeling and simulation tools can address the 
research issues, identifying gaps or issues that require further investment in tools 
and algorithm development.  
 
These research objectives support the SLDAST RFA objectives [4]. 
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Simulation Setup 
This study used two software codes: Traffic Manager for the main simulation and AwSim 
for use in post-simulation analysis. A description of these is next, followed by a definition 
of the geographic region simulated and en route airspace volume for collection of data. 
Traffic Manager 
The approach for this study was to investigate the performance of Tactical ASAS using the 
Traffic Manager (TMX) air traffic simulation [5]. The National Aerospace Laboratory of 
the Netherlands (NLR) originally developed TMX and NASA Langley Research Center 
has made many enhancements. 
 
TMX was developed for use in studies of aircraft-based concepts in future ATM 
environments. TMX can be used as one component of a real-time simulation in an air-
traffic laboratory or as a stand-alone desktop simulation. This study used TMX as a stand-
alone, non real-time simulator without any human in the loop interaction.  
 
Currently, in stand-alone mode, TMX runs on a single workstation and can simulate up to 
2000 airborne aircraft. This limits experiments to the scope of e.g. one ATC center at up to 
three times current demand levels. Figures 1 and 2 are screenshots of the TMX graphical 
user interface. 
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Figure 1. TMX user interface showing AFR aircraft (green) and IFR aircraft (blue). 
 
  
Figure 2. TMX conflict prevention bands for heading, speed and vertical rate. 
(Yellow band indicates a predicted conflict within 5 minutes, red within 3 minutes.) 
Heading 
Band 
(degrees) 
Indicated 
Airspeed 
Band (kts) 
Vertical Rate 
Band  
(100's ft per  
Minute) 
 7
 
TMX models aircraft performance and flight deck systems in detail, but does not have 
models of ground-based air traffic control or traffic flow management and does not limit 
airspace sector and airport capacity. For this study, the focus was on the en-route portion of 
the flight, from airport departure fix to airport arrival fix. 
 
TMX uses an aircraft dynamics model with aircraft performance data from the Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA) developed and maintained by the Eurocontrol Experimental Centre 
in Brétigny, France [6]. BADA uses a total energy model that is a reduced point-mass 
model that equates the rate of work done by forces acting on the aircraft to the rates of 
increase of potential and kinetic energy.  
 
Input to this model comes from an operations performance model, which defines the mass, 
flight envelope, aerodynamics, engine thrust, and fuel consumption for common aircraft 
types. The BADA airline procedures model defines the speeds used during the climb, 
cruise and descent flight phases.  
 
All aircraft within TMX may be equipped with some or all of: 
  
• auto-flight functionality 
• 4D Flight Management System (FMS) 
• RTA meeting capability 
• ADS-B  
• CD&R 
• P-ASAS 
 
The effect of wind is included and there is a model for pilot reaction time and scheduling 
effects. TMX has the capability to include randomized errors for all modeled systems, 
including wind measurement and prediction errors. For this study, there were no system or 
wind errors. 
CD&R Algorithm 
The KB3D CD&R algorithm was implemented within TMX for use in this study. KB3D is 
a tactical, state-based CD&R algorithm developed in the Safety Critical Avionics Systems 
Branch at NASA Langley Research Center [7].   
 
The KB3D algorithm provides one or more horizontal and vertical resolutions by 
calculating analytical solutions using linear trajectory projections. KB3D considers two 
aircraft in conflict, solving the most urgent conflict first. Resolutions are independent, so 
only one aircraft needs to maneuver and resolutions are coordinated so both aircraft can 
maneuver. 
 
An advantage of an analytic approach is that the underlying math is amenable to formal 
proof of correctness. This allowed the mathematical properties of KB3D to be extensively 
studied and formalized in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [8]. Formal proof using 
PVS guarantees that the algorithm will provide a resolution; however, KB3D does not 
check the resolution maneuvers for physical feasibility. 
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Since KB3D does not take into account other aircraft when calculating resolutions for an 
aircraft pair, it is possible for resolutions to create additional secondary conflicts. The 
conflict prevention system helps the pilot avoid such conflicts. 
 
In addition, KB3D does not check the resolution maneuvers for physical feasibility. This 
means that a resolution maneuver may call for turn rates, speed changes or vertical rates 
that the aircraft is not capable of performing.  
 
If an aircraft cannot fully execute the resolution maneuver, it may not be possible to 
resolve the conflict in time to avoid loss of separation (LoS). This should occur 
infrequently; calculation of the minimal resolution maneuver required is an objective of the 
algorithm design.  
Flight Priority Rules 
Priority rules are used to establish right of way for one aircraft, so normally only one 
aircraft is required to maneuver when a conflict is detected. The resolution maneuvers 
provided by KB3D will solve the conflict if only one aircraft maneuvers, since they are 
independent. The advantage of using such rules is to avoid disruption to the planned 
trajectory of the aircraft with priority. This increases the efficiency of flight for that 
aircraft. 
 
However, in the event that a short-term conflict is detected, both aircraft maneuver. This 
will also solve the conflict, since KB3D provides coordinated resolution maneuvers. The 
purpose here is to solve the conflict sooner, by having both aircraft take avoiding action. 
 
These are the priority rules used for this study: 
 
1. IFR aircraft have priority over AFR aircraft. 
2. Aircraft that are more maneuverable have to give priority to less maneuverable 
aircraft, based on maneuver categories. 
3. Level aircraft have priority over climbing and descending aircraft. 
4. Descending aircraft have priority over climbing aircraft. 
5. If two aircraft are in the same flight phase, the overtaking aircraft should give 
priority. An aircraft is considered to be overtaking if it is closing from an aspect 
angle between 150 to 210 degrees of another aircraft. 
6. If none of the above applies, priority is allocated based on aircraft call sign. 
Pilot Model 
The TMX pilot model implements some decision-making, based on rules, to emulate the 
choices made by a human pilot when presented with resolution maneuver options. The 
pilot model also includes human reaction times that vary depending on the urgency of the 
situation. These may be randomized, but fixed values were used for this study.  
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Given a choice of resolution, the pilot (or pilot model within TMX) needs to consult the P-
ASAS conflict prevention system and select a maneuver that does not create additional 
secondary conflicts. Currently P-ASAS distinguishes between short-term conflicts (three 
minutes to predicted LoS) and long-term conflicts (five minutes to LoS). 
 
These are the decision rules: 
 
1. Select a heading resolution if the vertical resolution steers into a conflict prevention 
band. 
 
2. Select a vertical resolution if the heading resolution steers into a conflict prevention 
band. 
 
3. Select the maneuver that results in a long-term secondary conflict, if available, 
when both resolution directions steer into a conflict prevention band. 
 
4. Do nothing when the primary conflict is a long-term conflict and both resolutions 
directions steer into a short-term secondary conflict. 
 
5. When the time to LoS is within thirty seconds perform both lateral and vertical 
resolutions simultaneously. 
 
These are the pilot reaction times:  
 
1. Thirty seconds for a long-term conflict. 
 
2. Ten seconds for a short-term conflict. 
 
3. Five seconds for a secondary conflict. 
 
After selecting a maneuver, the pilot model waits for 150 seconds after resolving the 
conflict before returning to planned trajectory. This helps prevents re-occurrence of a 
conflict with the same aircraft. 
AwSim 
A trajectory analysis program, AwSim [9], was used to assist with the results evaluation. 
AwSim is a suite of trajectory simulation, conflict prediction, and metrics tools designed to 
perform a variety of air traffic simulation and evaluation tasks. Amongst other capabilities, 
this program allows visualization of recorded flight trajectories. A plan view of the NAS is 
supplemented by altitude profile information. AwSim has controls for fast-forward, 
rewind, pause and step forward or backward in time.  
Region of Study 
The airspace region used for this study is Fort Worth Center (ZFW) (see figure 3). All 
aircraft departing from, flying through or landing within ZFW are included in the 
simulation. Figure 4 shows the notional elevation view of the en route airspace defined for 
this experiment, with altitude bounds from 17,000 ft to 60,000 ft. The CD&R and P-ASAS 
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systems were functional from departure, through transition into the experiment volume and 
then turned off as aircraft exit from the experiment volume. Flights were deleted from the 
simulation as they descended through 5000 ft. 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Fort Worth Center airspace. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment airspace. 
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Flight Data Sets 
The flight trajectories that were recorded by the Enhanced Traffic Management System 
(ETMS) on 19 February 2004 form the basis for the flight data sets used in this study. This 
day is one of the JPDO baseline traffic days, representing a typical day in the NAS with 
good weather and moderately high traffic flow. Thus, simulated traffic flows are realistic, 
based on actual recorded data. The simulated traffic flows retain the complexity of the 
traffic flows within ZFW center. 
 
The study flight data sets consisted of IFR-only, AFR-only and mixed scenarios and range 
from one to three times current demand levels. The increased demand levels were created 
by copying the baseline-recorded trajectories and rescheduling as described below. Table 1 
shows the number of flights in each of the data sets. 
 
 IFR 
baseline 
schedule 
1X AFR 2X AFR 3X AFR 1X IFR 
+ 
1X AFR 
1X IFR 
+ 
2X AFR 
Total flights 4,079 4,079 8,158 12,237 8,158 12,237
Table 1. Flight data sets used in simulation. 
The IFR flights use the as-flown trajectories that were derived from the ETMS radar track 
data (TZ) messages. The IFR flight schedule is almost exactly as flown, with slight 
adjustments in departure times; these were made as necessary to ensure a minimum 
spacing of 70 seconds between aircraft arriving at the same arrival fix. This time spacing 
ensures in-trail separations are approximately 5 nm.  
 
The AFR flights are based on the same ETMS data converted to great-circle routes. AFR 
flights are also scheduled to meet 70 seconds spacing at the arrival fix. AFR flights flew 
fuel-optimal trajectories based on BADA performance data and were not constrained by 
the current cardinality rules for flight altitude levels.  
 
For the mixed flight schedules, AFR flights were inserted into gaps in the IFR arrivals 
streams at each fix to maintain a minimum of 70 seconds spacing. 
 
The use of 70 seconds spacing ensures that the minimum distance between aircraft at the 
airport arrival fixes is approximately five nm. For simplicity of scheduling, generic arrival 
fixes replace the actual arrival fixes for both IFR and AFR flights. Four generic fixes are 
equally spaced on a 40 nm radius circle centered on each airport. This four-corner post 
arrangement is close to the actual fix arrangement used by many airports (an example is 
DFW).  
 
Scripted conflicts were not included in this experiment. Rather, all aircraft departed their 
origin airports at their nominal time to meet their RTA at the arrival fixes. Conflicts 
developed naturally without pre-determination. The result is that the ASAS system is 
subjected to a full range of traffic situations and geometries that ranged from simple to 
quite complex. The experiment was therefore a blind test of whether the conflict 
management algorithms and procedures were robust to all of the conditions that were 
encountered. 
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Results 
The flight data sets described previously were used as input to TMX for simulation of 24 
hours worth of NAS operations. Simulation of a complete day captures the peaks and 
troughs in demand that typically occur. 
 
The results presented below were obtained from simulations that employed error-free 
surveillance data. The simulation test cases used actual wind data from 19 February 2004, 
without errors between actual and predicted winds.  
 
The modeling included aircraft dynamic performance, with error-free FMS performance. 
Pilot response times were included, but were not randomized. TMX has the ability to 
include randomized errors for all modeled systems, including wind measurement and 
prediction errors; the performance of ASAS with realistic errors is the subject of on-going 
and future research.  
 
The results analysis is organized into the following sections: first, traffic densities; next, 
conflicts and losses of separation; finally, flight efficiency. 
Traffic Densities 
Table 2 shows various measures of traffic density in the simulation. By design, the 24-hour 
demand was twice and three times the baseline. The number of aircraft airborne at any time 
varies according to the schedule and the peak does not reach exactly twice and three times 
the demand. The peak flight density multiplier is somewhat less than the 2X and 3X input 
demand because flights are re-scheduled to ensure a minimum of 70 seconds between 
aircraft at the airport arrival fixes.  
 
2X AFR 3X AFR  IFR 
baseline 
schedule 
Flights Multiple 
of baseline
Flights Multiple 
 of baseline
Total flights  
in 24 hrs 
4,079 8,158 2X 12,237 3X
Peak flights in 
simulation 
516 1,035 2X 1,519 2.9X
Peak flights ZFW 126 241 1.9X 326 2.6X
Mean flights ZFW in 
24 hrs 
61 114 1.9X 171 2.8X
Table 2. Number of aircraft in the simulation. 
 
The busiest sector within ZFW was ZFW4201 High sector. This sector had a maximum 
count of 46 aircraft simultaneously in the sector for the 3X demand compared with 17 for 
the baseline number of airborne aircraft. This is well in excess of the current maximum 
capacity of 20 aircraft set by the monitor alert parameter (MAP) value (see figure 5). FAA 
traffic flow managers compare the projected number of aircraft in a sector with the MAP 
value to determine if a sector is likely to be overloaded. 
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Figure 5. Number of aircraft in busiest ZFW sector (ZFW4201 High). 
 
A discussion of Tactical ASAS performance follows in the next sections, in terms of 
conflicts and losses of separation and efficiency of flight. Note, however, that traffic 
densities outside of ZFW center are less than the actual traffic densities because not all 
flights in the NAS could be included in the simulation. For this reason, conflict data was 
analyzed within the experiment volume only. Data outside of the experiment volume does 
not represent the performance of Tactical ASAS at full traffic densities. Likewise, 
efficiency data is interpreted with the caveats stated in the relevant section. 
 
Conflicts and Losses of Separation 
 
The terms used and values of key parameters are presented prior to discussion of results.  
 
Definitions of terms are: 
• Conflict: a predicted loss of separation within a given look-ahead time (One pair of 
aircraft in conflict count as two conflicts). 
• IFR to AFR Conflicts: conflicts detected first by IFR aircraft  
• AFR to IFR Conflicts: conflicts detected first by AFR aircraft  
• LoS: Loss of Separation (One pair of aircraft count as one loss). 
• CPA: Closest Point of Approach between an aircraft and any other. 
 
The criteria used to report a LoS are: 
• Aircraft closer than 5 nm lateral distance and 900 ft altitude, for more than 10 
seconds duration. 
 
The protected zone around an aircraft to detect a conflict is: 
• AFR to AFR:   5.1 nm lateral, 950 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
• AFR to IFR:    6.1 nm lateral, 1,150 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
• IFR to AFR: 5.1 nm lateral, 950 ft altitude at 180 seconds look-ahead time. 
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The zone around an aircraft for conflict resolution is: 
• AFR to AFR:  5.2 nm lateral, 1100 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time.  
• AFR to IFR:    6.2 nm lateral, 1300 ft altitude at 300 seconds look-ahead time. 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The conflict resolution zone was larger than the protected zone to allow some 
uncertainty buffer, increasing the probability that the conflict would be resolved by 
the resolution maneuver. 
 
2. A larger protected zone between AFR to IFR aircraft and a longer look-ahead time 
relative to IFR to AFR was used. The intent was that the AFR aircraft would detect 
and resolve the conflict with the IFR aircraft before the ground controller was 
alerted to the impending conflict. 
 
3. The vertical separation minima is 900 ft rather than the current vertical separation 
minima of 1000 ft, since aircraft may be up to 100 ft from assigned altitude due to 
allowable altimeter inaccuracy. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained from analysis of data logged by TMX within the 
experiment volume described in the experiment set up section. 
 
ETMS 
based 
1X IFR 
(from 
ETMS) 
1X AFR 2X AFR 3X AFR 1X IFR + 
1X AFR 
1X IFR + 
2X AFR 
Flights 4,079 4,079 8,158 12,237 8,158 12,237
Conflicts NA/ 1,021 4,155 9,257 4,751 12,228
IFR_AFR 
conflicts 
NA/ N/A N/A N/A 628 1,144
Number of 
LoS 
N/A 0 3 25 26  
(2 AFR/ AFR) 
58
(25 AFR/ AFR) 
Resolved 
Conflicts 
(%) 
N/A 100.0% 99.9% 99.5% 98.9% 99.1%
Table 3. Conflicts and losses of separation within experiment volume. 
 
The results show that Tactical ASAS, using the KB3D CD&R algorithm, in combination 
with P-ASAS can prevent all losses of separation for the 1X demand scenario if all aircraft 
are AFR flights. For the 2X AFR scenario, one of the three LoS is attributable to Tactical 
ASAS. The LoS was of short duration with a separation of 4.5 nm at the CPA. The other 
two LoS are caused by an experiment set up issue that is discussed in the next section. 
 
The number of LoS increases for the 3X AFR scenario. However, all but four of the LoS 
had a CPA larger than 3 nm. The closest encounter had a CPA of 0.18 nm, but in this case, 
the vertical separation was 818 ft, which is just under the 900 ft vertical separation criteria 
used for this study. 
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The mixed 1X IFR + 1X AFR case has many IFR to AFR conflicts. Note that this would 
require the IFR aircraft to take action to avoid the AFR aircraft, which is contrary to the 
concept design. In addition, considerably more losses of separation occurred compared 
with the all-AFR scenario with the same 2X demand.   
 
The mixed 1X IFR + 2X AFR case has one-third more conflicts and more than twice as 
many losses of separation than the all-AFR case at the same 3X demand level. 
 
The causes for many of the LoS are understood; discussion of causes and some suggestions 
for improving the performance of Tactical ASAS follows.  
Analysis of Loss of Separation 
The AwSim trajectory analysis tool assists visualization of the actual flown trajectories 
recorded during TMX simulation. The recorded trajectories include all conflict resolution 
maneuvers. Visualization viewed alongside additional data logged by TMX, facilitates 
understanding of the cause of the LoS.  
Discussion of Causes of Loss of Separation 
The list below identifies the causes of the LoS for the 2X AFR, 3X AFR and the 1X AFR 
+ 1X IFR scenarios and the number of cases that are attributed to each cause. (The 1X 
AFR + 2X AFR scenario has not been analyzed in detail.) Note that a LoS may have more 
than one cause.  
 
1. AFR aircraft maneuvers into short-term conflict (24 LoS) 
 
The conflict prevention system should prevent maneuvers that result in conflicts 
with predicted LoS in less than three minutes. This was not always the case, 
particularly with climbing and descending aircraft. P-ASAS assumes linear 
trajectory propagation and linear climb and descent profiles. Actual aircraft may be 
changing speed or heading and often do not climb or descend linearly. Aircraft in 
the simulation above 18,000 ft are climbing or descending at constant Mach. Since 
groundspeed reduces with altitude at constant Mach (in the troposphere), this 
results in a flight path that curves in the vertical Cartesian plane. In addition, an 
aircraft climbs more slowly near its maximum altitude limit. For these reasons, P-
ASAS may incorrectly predict aircraft trajectory, leading to incorrect conflict 
bands. 
 
Aircraft sometimes maneuver into short-term conflict for a different reason; the 
pilot model occasionally selects resolution maneuvers that contradict the P-ASAS 
conflict prevention system. In some circumstances, this problem is unavoidable, 
because conflict bands may indicate that all resolution maneuvers provided by 
KB3D result in a secondary conflict.  
 
2. CD&R and P-ASAS inactivated below 17,000 ft (16 Los) 
 
The experiment was purposely set up to turn off CD&R and P-ASAS below 17,000 
ft, because the concept studied is for en route airspace. Once turned off, CD&R and 
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P-ASAS are not turned on again. Thus, an unintended side effect results where one 
aircraft descends below the boundary and then levels off into a short-term conflict. 
An aircraft can likewise descend below the boundary during the climb phase of 
flight because of a conflict maneuver and then resume climbing above 17,000 ft 
and cause short-term conflicts throughout the remainder of the flight. 
  
3. Poor resolution choice (14 LoS) 
 
The pilot model is not sophisticated and can occasionally select a maneuver that is 
a poor choice or that takes the aircraft into an irretrievably complex situation. 
KB3D offers a choice of resolution maneuvers for the two aircraft in conflict, 
independent of the trajectories of other aircraft; the human pilot, supported by P-
ASAS selects the most appropriate resolution.  
 
4. KB3D fails to predict a conflict in time to prevent LoS (11 LoS) 
 
KB3D sometimes detects a conflict with fewer than three minutes to LoS. In a few 
cases, only seconds remained before LoS, which is too short a time to resolve the 
conflict. This problem occurs mainly with climbing and descending aircraft. The 
KB3D algorithm assumes linear trajectory propagation and linear climb and 
descent profiles. For the same reasons as explained for cause 1, this can lead to 
inaccurate prediction of the aircraft trajectory. Consequently, prediction error can 
cause KB3D to detect conflicts too late to prevent a LoS. 
 
5. KB3D does not continue to provide resolutions once aircraft are in LoS (6 
LoS) 
 
The current design of KB3D does not calculate resolutions if the aircraft in conflict 
move into LoS. This problem can prolong the LoS, lead to a closer encounter and 
potentially lead to a further LoS with additional aircraft. For AFR to IFR cases 
where a 6 nm protected zone is used, KB3D stops providing resolutions once the 
aircraft are closer than the 6 nm protected zone even though the separation criteria 
for LoS have not been violated. This is because KB3D does not currently 
distinguish between an additional buffer zone and the actual separation criteria.  
 
6. IFR aircraft maneuvers into short-term conflict with AFR (6 LoS) 
 
The simulated IFR aircraft currently fly ETMS recorded trajectories. No 
mechanism is included in the simulation to prevent IFR aircraft from creating 
short-term conflicts.  
 
7. KB3D does not take into account aircraft performance (3 LoS) 
 
While geometrically correct, KB3D may provide a resolution maneuver that is 
beyond the capabilities of the aircraft. The aircraft may not be able to respond 
quickly enough, or the speed or the requested altitude may not be feasible. The 
resolution maneuver may sometimes require an aircraft to climb when it is near the 
aircraft altitude ceiling 
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The most common cause of LoS was a failure to prevent an AFR heading or altitude 
change from causing a short-term conflict. This cause may be due to a failure of the P-
ASAS system to predict conflict bands accurately or a failure of the pilot model to consider 
the bands.   
 
Currently, TMX uses a geometric calculation for predicting conflict bands, similar but not 
the same as the KB3D algorithm uses for conflict resolution. This can be replaced by a 
KB3D-based system to determine conflict bands. This would be preferable for consistency 
with the resolution maneuvers. In addition, using realistic assumptions for climb and 
descent profiles can improve trajectory prediction. Using buffer zones that are larger for 
aircraft not in level flight can better account for uncertainty. 
 
Improvements to the pilot model may prevent some of the LoS where the model selects a 
maneuver that fails to consider the conflict bands. An indication of the maneuver with the 
longest time to LoS could assist the human pilot in making a decision and facilitate a better 
simulation model. 
 
The second most common cause is a problem with simulation set up; Tactical ASAS is 
turned off below 17,000 ft. The experiment set up problem will be fixed for future studies. 
 
The third most common cause is a poor choice of resolution, which can be attributed to an 
unsophisticated pilot model. Given a choice of maneuver from KB3D, a human pilot may 
have avoided the LoS by selecting a better choice of resolution maneuver. Some measure 
of traffic complexity in the region of the proposed maneuver may facilitate a better choice 
of maneuver. This would enable the pilot model in a simulation to make a better choice 
and might be a useful aid to a human pilot who is using ASAS. 
 
Solutions to the remaining causes of LoS are also under consideration. These include 
enhancements to KB3D to improve trajectory prediction and to continue providing 
resolutions for aircraft in LoS. Checking of resolutions for physical feasibility is an 
obvious enhancement e.g. for aircraft near their altitude ceiling a climb is not a good 
choice of resolution. In this case, a heading change or descent would be the better choice. 
 
A version of KB3D that uses some knowledge of aircraft intent is being designed. 
Conflicts may reduce if a strategic component to ASAS is included; this should lead to a 
corresponding reduction in LoS.  
 
Strategic ASAS cannot prevent all short-term conflicts that arise from unplanned 
maneuvers (e.g. for conflict resolution maneuvers, intent data may not be available). 
Therefore, in a mixed equipage environment controllers may be required to avoid 
vectoring IFR aircraft into short-term conflicts with AFR aircraft.  
 
A discussion of the causes of LoS for each of the scenarios analyzed follows; tables 4, 5 
and 6 present details of the LoS. 
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2X AFR Scenario 
 
For the 2X AFR scenario, only the AAL1591/ AAL1638 LoS is attributable to ASAS 
because the other two LoS were caused by the problem with experiment setup. The 
AAL1591/ AAL1638 LoS was of short duration with a separation of nearly 4.5 nm at the 
CPA.  
 
Aircraft  
ID 
Flight  
Rules 
CPA 
(nm) 
Dura- 
tion 
(sec) 
Alt. 1 
(ft) 
Alt. 2  
(ft) 
Alt. 
Dif. 
(ft) 
Cause
1SWA1937 1CAA783 AFR AFR 2.34 38 17926 17108 818 2 
AAL1591 AAL1638 AFR AFR 4.47 16 25887 26177 290 4 
1N446M N446M AFR AFR 4.85 18 17368 16582 786 2 
Table 4. 2X AFR loss of separation 
3X AFR Scenario 
 
For the 3X AFR scenario, two of the LoS were due to experiment setup. Four out of five of 
the LoS with smallest CPA were only just within the 900 ft vertical separation standard. 
The likely cause is prediction inaccuracies, either in KB3D or P-ASAS or both.  
 
If aircraft are vertically separated, this allows aircraft to become close in the horizontal 
dimension, so a small inaccuracy in vertical trajectory prediction can suddenly lead to a 
very short-term conflict. The reverse is also true, but the consequences are less severe, 
since the horizontal separation standard is more than six times larger than the vertical 
separation standard. 
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Aircraft  
ID 
Flight  
Rules 
CPA
(nm) 
Dura-
tion 
(sec) 
Alt. 1
(ft) 
Alt. 2  
(ft) 
Alt. 
Dif. (ft) 
Cause 
2SWA440 1NWA1857 AFR AFR 0.18 36 34888 34000 888 1,3 
AWE7815 2AWE7815 AFR AFR 1.20 82 34111 35000 889 1 
1COA1153 1SKW9519 AFR AFR 1.40 122 28820 29428 608 1,3 
1CXP213 5TRS103 AFR AFR 2.77 56 35115 36000 885 1 
AWE664 1DAL463 AFR AFR 3.11 32 35000 35866 866 1 
2N183PC 6N560KT AFR AFR 3.37 16 25195 24733 462 1 
1AAL791 2BTA2190 AFR AFR 3.52 12 38042 37184 858 1 
2N213CC N698PW AFR AFR 3.54 38 21417 21106 311 1,3,4 
2BKA535 5BKA535 AFR AFR 3.55 82 22718 21834 884 4 
N1903G 3N1903G AFR AFR 3.80 72 40360 40000 360 3,7 
2N421NL 1N421NL AFR AFR 3.93 46 23000 23294 294 3,4 
N520E 1N520E AFR AFR 4.06 52 20273 20725 452 1,3,4 
1AAL1625 2AAL1625 AFR AFR 4.30 146 23847 22952 895 1,4 
1SWA1939 1N738K AFR AFR 4.39 20 28963 28364 599 1,3,4 
3N904SB 4CAA863 AFR AFR 4.41 28 18407 18312 95 2 
AAL1194 SWA675 AFR AFR 4.48 12 40266 40000 266 1 
AAL2851 AAL1663 AFR AFR 4.49 12 19628 19169 459 2 
1N60RE 1AMW2628 AFR AFR 4.54 46 19397 18532 865 2 
BKA535 7BKA535 AFR AFR 4.58 30 26881 25994 887 3 
CHQ5827 2CHQ5827 AFR AFR 4.61 12 36001 35742 259 1, 3 
UAL372 2UAL372 AFR AFR 4.65 16 38000 38163 163 1,3 
AAL840 2AAL1505 AFR AFR 4.69 14 36007 36000 7 1 
2CAA511 2AAL1255 AFR AFR 4.72 18 20022 19607 415 1,4 
1COA1289 2COA1289 AFR AFR 4.84 16 36097 36000 97 1 
EGF553 1EGF553 AFR AFR 4.88 12 21000 20385 615 1 
Table 5. 3X AFR loss of separation 
 
1X AFR + 1X IFR Scenario 
 
For the 1X AFR + 1X IFR mixed equipage scenario, the following LoS categories are 
used: 
• AFR to AFR 
• AFR to IFR 
• IFR to AFR 
For the mixed cases, the order indicates which aircraft detected the conflict first. 
 
Only two AFR to AFR LoS occurred, of which only 1DAL730/ 2N49CT is attributable to 
Tactical ASAS. This LoS results from a complex encounter and likely has multiple causes.  
 
Of the AFR to IFR LoS, the cause of six of the fourteen is an IFR aircraft maneuvering 
into short-term conflict with the AFR. This may indicate a need for the air traffic controller 
to be aware of the AFR aircraft and avoid vectoring IFR aircraft into a short-term conflict. 
Knowledge of the short-term intent of IFR aircraft by ASAS would likely avoid some of 
these LoS, but not all. 
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Since the protected zone and look-ahead time for conflict prediction is larger between AFR 
to IFR than for IFR to AFR, then IFR to AFR LoS should not have occurred. In fact, all of 
the ten LoS that occurred in this category are due to the simulation setup problem (item 2 
in the list of causes of LoS) and are not attributable to Tactical ASAS. 
 
 
Aircraft  
ID 
Flight  
Rules 
CPA 
(nm) 
Dura-
tion 
 (sec) 
Alt. 1 
(ft) 
Alt. 2  
(ft) 
Alt. 
Dif. (ft) 
Cause 
1DAL730 2N49CT AFR AFR 1.68 176 40715 40267 448 3,4,5,7 
3SWA143 1CAA586 AFR AFR 4.11 30 17233 16373 860 2 
          
1SKW3728 N390DP AFR IFR 2.14 48 38011 37945 66 3,4 
2DAL1687 UAL1293 AFR IFR 2.64 48 31270 31000 270 1,7 
1AAL888 EGF469 AFR IFR 2.91 36 29313 29000 313 5,6 
1AAL420 AAL2347 AFR IFR 3.44 16 28413 29050 637 5,6 
2CAA610 N698PW AFR IFR 3.47 240 21108 22000 892 1,5 
1EGF535 EGF535 AFR IFR 3.75 64 19745 20456 711 5,6 
1AAL323 1DAL2088 AFR IFR 3.75 12 24333 25142 809 6 
1PCE252 SWA1073 AFR IFR 4.02 44 38348 39000 652 1,3 
3AAL743 VPBDJ AFR IFR 4.18 30 26315 27000 685 1 
2N81432 AAL1163 AFR IFR 4.26 48 29788 30675 887 6 
1BTA3305 JOSA614 AFR IFR 4.59 38 35210 35000 210 3 
2AAL1191 AAL1916 AFR IFR 4.60 80 20318 20780 462 1,4 
2N650LR 1N650LR AFR IFR 4.80 42 19258 19000 258 1,5 
4JOSA453 2AJI5 AFR IFR 4.90 28 20393 20805 412 6 
          
1SWA43 2SWA43 IFR AFR 0.91 32 17042 16441 601 2 
1SWA36 2N568WC IFR AFR 1.76 84 17067 17095 28 2 
1EGF796 2EGF796 IFR AFR 2.11 12 19299 18498 801 2 
AAL745 1AAL745 IFR AFR 2.26 26 18120 17286 834 2 
N427CD 1AAL745 IFR AFR 2.45 32 18269 17428 841 2 
1AAL2846 1SWA340 IFR AFR 2.48 196 17053 17018 35 2 
FDX3004 3EJA782 IFR AFR 3.04 72 31224 32118 894 2 
EJA782 3EJA782 IFR AFR 3.54 40 17909 17011 898 2 
SWA40 1EGF526 IFR AFR 4.16 26 17824 17027 797 2 
AAL1023 3EJA782 IFR AFR 4.52 24 28522 29409 887 2 
Table 6. 1X AFR plus 1X IFR mixed equipage loss of separation 
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Detailed Analysis of Three Selected Loss of Separation 
The figures in the following analysis are screen shots from the AwSim trajectory analysis 
program. The aircraft data block in the figures below shows aircraft identifier, altitude and 
ground speed. Aircraft circle radius is 2.5 nm in all figures, so overlapping circles indicate 
a LoS, if altitude separation is less than 900 ft. 
 
3X AFR Scenario 
 
2SWA440 and 1NWA1857  
 
 
Figure 6. Example of pilot model/ 
conflict prevention system failure  
 
Figure 7. Example of poor recovery 
maneuver 
 
2SWA440 is initially at 35 kft and 1NWA1857 is at 34 kft, see figure 6.  
 
2SWA440 detects a conflict with a third aircraft, 1SWA440, which is overtaking 2SWA440 
along the same flight track. This causes 2SWA440 to initiate a conflict resolution descent. 
An almost immediate LoS with 1NWA1857 occurs 
 
In this case, the conflict prevention system had altitude bands blocking a descent but the 
pilot model still commanded 2SWA440 to descend. The heading change occurs after the 
LoS has occurred, and is a recovery maneuver built into the pilot model since KB3D does 
not provide resolutions once aircraft are in LoS. The recovery maneuver is also a poor 
choice since this brings it back across the track of 1SWA440, see figure 7. 
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1COA1153 and 1SKW9519 
 
 
Figure 8. Example of four aircraft 
encounter 
 
Figure 9. Example of poor resolution 
choice
This is a complex encounter with four aircraft involved, see figure 8. 1COA1153 is at 28 
kft and climbing, 1SKW9519 is at 29 kft and climbing. 1SKW9519 detects a conflict with a 
third aircraft 2COA1153 and performs a heading resolution. This puts 1SKW9519 into 
conflict with a fourth aircraft SKW9519. 1SKW9519 performs another heading resolution 
that takes it behind SKW9519 and avoids a loss of separation with SKW9519, but this 
causes an immediate conflict with 1COA1153 that leads to a LoS; see figure 9. Given a 
choice of maneuver from the CD&R algorithm, a human pilot may have been able to 
choose a better resolution. The ASAS concept has the pilot make the final determination of 
the resolution maneuver chosen from one of the resolution options provided by the 
automation.  
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1X AFR plus 1X IFR Mixed Equipage Scenario 
 
2N81432 AFR and AAL1163 IFR 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of AFR/ IFR aircraft 
encounter 
 
Figure 11. Example of IFR maneuver 
into short-term conflict
2N81432 is initially at 29 kft and climbing, AAL1163 is at 31 kft and descending; see 
figure 10. AAL1163, the IFR aircraft, makes a heading change that causes a short-term 
conflict with 2N81432, with time to LoS of 31 seconds; see figure 11. IFR aircraft are not 
equipped with a conflict prevention system and the simulation does not have a controller 
model, so IFR aircraft do not attempt to avoid conflicts. 2N81432 attempts a heading 
resolution, but does not have time to complete the maneuver. 
Efficiency 
NAS-wide simulation with full traffic densities over all regions of airspace is the best 
means to obtain reliable efficiency metrics. This is not possible using TMX, because TMX 
currently has a limit of 2000 airborne flights. At three times current demand levels, around 
15,000 to 20,000 flights may be airborne in the NAS at the peak time.  
 
Interpretation of results relating to efficiency is subject to the following caveats: 
 
1. The AFR results overstate the efficiency of flight because full traffic density is not 
achieved outside of the experiment volume.  
 
2. The IFR results are from simulation of actual recorded trajectories that include all 
conflict resolution maneuvers. These trajectories are from the real NAS, so all IFR 
aircraft experienced the full traffic density throughout the flight. AFR flights 
experienced full traffic density in the experiment area only. It is therefore not valid 
to compare IFR and AFR flight efficiencies.  
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3. IFR flights may purposely deviate from great-circle routes to follow a more wind 
optimal route or to avoid restricted airspace, weather or turbulence. Therefore, 
attributing the entire IFR distance penalty to restricted air-routes and controller 
resolution advisories is not valid. 
 
4. The scope of this study was en route, so Tactical ASAS is active from departure fix 
until the aircraft leaves the experiment volume. Consequently, the efficiency 
metrics do not include the arrival or departure flight segments. 
 
However, given the caveats, the simulation results show some interesting trends, as 
analyzed in the following sections. 
Distance, Time and Fuel 
Table 7 presents the mean increase in average flight distance, time of flight and fuel used 
for the IFR and AFR-only scenarios. (The efficiency of the mixed equipage scenarios was 
not analyzed). 
 
The basis for comparison is the same aircraft flying an unimpeded great-circle route, using 
a fuel-efficient trajectory computed by TMX. The IFR and AFR flights are not compared 
directly for reasons explained above. The data are for the flight trajectory from departure 
fix to the arrival fix. 
 
 Distance (nm) Time (seconds) Fuel (lbs) 
IFR 17.0 (2.5%) -110.7 (-1.9%) 500.0 (5.8%) 
1X AFR 2.5 (0.4%) 11.5 (0.2%) 200.0 (2.4%) 
2X AFR 6.9 (1.0%) 45.3 (0.7%) 300.0 (4.0%) 
3X AFR 12.1 (1.8%) 86.7 (1.4%) 500.0 (5.4%) 
Table 7. Mean increase in flight distance, time and fuel used.  
(Compared to unimpeded great-circle routes.) 
 
The IFR flight distance was somewhat more than the great-circle distance, with a 
significant excess fuel burn. However, the IFR flights actually had a mean flight time that 
was less than the unimpeded great-circle flights. Therefore, IFR flights are flying 
somewhat faster than the TMX computed fuel-efficient speed. In addition, the excess fuel 
burn might be partially due to IFR aircraft flying at altitudes that are not fuel-optimal 
because of TFM constraints.  
 
The 1X AFR mean excess flight distance and excess fuel burn was small compared to the 
unimpeded flights. For AFR flights, this excess is the penalty that arises from conflict 
resolution maneuvers. The penalty increases as the demand level increases as expected.  
RTA Capability 
Table 8 shows the ability of aircraft to meet an RTA at the arrival fix. Aircraft used the 
closed-loop algorithm modeled in TMX to adjust aircraft speed within their flight 
envelope, to meet the RTA. This allows the aircraft to compensate for trajectory deviations 
caused by e.g. conflict resolution maneuvers.  
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 % Flights +-  
5 Sec. of RTA 
% Flights +- 
10 Sec. of RTA 
1X AFR 94.7 95.2 
2X AFR 83.8 85.3 
3X AFR 74.2 76.1 
Table 8. Percentage of flights meeting RTA. 
 
Almost 95% of aircraft meet the RTA within 5 seconds for the 1X scenario. However, the 
RTA meeting capability degrades as demand increases.  
 
Figure 12 shows the probability distribution of the difference between RTA and actual 
time of arrival. 
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Figure 12. Difference in actual and required time at arrival fix. 
 
Although most flights manage to meet the RTA within 6 seconds there are a number of 
outliers, particularly for the 3X demand. One cause is the increased number of conflicts as 
traffic densities increase. However, it may be possible to improve the RTA algorithm.  
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Discussion of Results 
Support of Research Objectives 
The results obtained from analysis of simulation data support the four main research 
objectives of this study.  
 
Results showed that Tactical ASAS alone accommodated current demand levels with zero 
LoS while efficiently resolving conflicts and meeting the RTA at the arrival fix. At the 1X 
demand level, almost 95% of AFR aircraft are able to meet the RTA within 5 seconds. 
(Supports Research Objective 1)  
 
With all aircraft equipped with Tactical ASAS, at the 2X demand level three LoS occurred, 
of which two were attributed to an experiment setup issue. At the 3X demand level, the 
number of LoS increased significantly, but Tactical ASAS alone still efficiently resolved 
more than 99% of conflicts. (Supports Research Objective 2) 
 
With the mixed equipage scenarios, at the 2X demand level, there were 26 LoS compared 
to only three LoS with all AFR aircraft. However, 10 of the 26 LoS are due to an 
experiment setup issue and a further six LoS were attributed to the IFR aircraft 
maneuvering into short-term conflict with an AFR aircraft.  
 
Use of a conflict probe by an air traffic controller may avoid vectoring IFR aircraft into 
short-term conflicts with AFR. This may enable the performance of Tactical ASAS in a 
mixed equipage environment to improve considerably, but likely not to the same level as 
with all AFR aircraft. (Supports Research Objective 3) 
 
Analysis of simulation data uncovered a number of issues with the TMX simulation and 
KB3D algorithm. (Supports Research Objective 4) 
 
The main issues that require further investigation and investment in simulator and 
algorithm enhancements are: 
TMX Specific Issues 
1. The pilot model within TMX is not sophisticated and can make a poor choice of 
resolution maneuver. 
 
2. The conflict prevention system may not always predict conflict bands accurately, 
possibly due to the assumption of linear trajectory propagation. 
 
3. IFR aircraft can maneuver into short-term conflict with AFR due to lack of a 
controller model. 
 
4. The experiment setup disabled Tactical ASAS by design once an aircraft descended 
below 17,000 ft, but neglected to enable again if the aircraft subsequently climbed 
above 17,000 ft. 
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5. TMX data logging is inadequate to allow analysis of all LoS. 
 
6. TMX cannot record and replay a scenario, so post-run visualization of LoS is not 
possible within TMX. 
 
7. TMX is not currently capable of simulating more than 2000 simultaneously 
airborne flights. This limits the scope of simulation to a single ATC center at 3X 
demand levels. Obtaining NAS wide metrics directly is therefore not possible. 
KB3D Specific Issues 
1. KB3D does not continue to provide conflict resolution maneuvers once an 
aircraft is in LoS, so LoS can be prolonged and lead to smaller CPA. 
 
2. KB3D does not always predict conflicts with sufficient time to avoid LoS, 
possibly due to the assumption of linear trajectory propagation. 
 
3. KB3D does not take into account aircraft performances, so it can provide 
resolution maneuvers that exceed aircraft performance. 
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Future Research 
The most common cause of LoS was an AFR or IFR aircraft maneuvering into a short-term 
conflict with another AFR aircraft that did not leave sufficient time for resolution.  
 
For IFR aircraft, a conflict-probe that indicates to the controller when a maneuver would 
cause a short-term conflict with an AFR aircraft could be one solution. This would require 
implementation as an algorithm and controller model within TMX.   
 
For AFR aircraft, the conflict prevention system should provide sufficient information to 
the pilot to avoid maneuvering into short-term conflicts. The current TMX model 
implementations did not always achieve this.   
 
The TMX pilot model contains some limitations and is the subject of research to improve 
the sophistication of the decision-making. Any modifications to the pilot model that result 
in improved performance might indicate the kind of information that can be displayed to a 
human pilot to aid decision making. 
 
Enhancements currently under consideration for future implementation are: 
 
1. Have the conflict prevention system provide the time to predicted loss of separation 
for any maneuvers that create short-term conflicts. Such an indication could allow 
the TMX pilot model to make an informed choice of maneuver when all resolutions 
lead to short-term conflicts.  
 
2. Calculate a measure of the traffic complexity in the region of the provided 
resolution maneuvers. This could help the pilot model to avoid maneuvering the 
aircraft into a complex situation if a choice of maneuver is available. 
 
3. Check all resolutions provided by KB3D for physical feasibility and indicate the 
margin or lack of, between the aircraft maximum aircraft performance. This could 
allow the pilot model to make a better choice of maneuver, when a choice is 
available. If there is not a feasible maneuver, then other options might be possible; 
e.g. temporarily reduce the protected zone for conflict prediction. Reducing the 
protected zone for short-term conflicts does not necessarily lead to LoS, since both 
aircraft will maneuver in a coordinated way. The resolution maneuvers provided by 
KB3D avoid LoS even if only one aircraft maneuvers, so a reduced protected zone 
may still prevent LoS. The maneuver required will be less if the protected zone is 
smaller.  
 
4. Improve the accuracy of trajectory prediction and calculate the uncertainty bounds 
dynamically rather than use a fixed buffer. This is particularly important in the 
vertical dimension, since the altitude separation standard is very much smaller than 
the lateral separation standard. It may be possible to e.g. assume a constant Mach 
climb, rather than propagate linearly. It may be possible to use e.g. a larger vertical 
uncertainty buffer when it is determined that an aircraft is not in level flight. This 
would benefit both CD&R and conflict prevention. 
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Once the Tactical ASAS system has been improved by incorporation of enhancements, 
then other elements of a complete integrated ASAS can be incorporated into the 
simulation. These elements include: 
 
1. Strategic, intent-based conflict detection and avoidance with a longer look-ahead 
time than that of the tactical system studied here. 
 
2. Precision merging and spacing to enable transition into the terminal area, beyond 
the en-route system studied here.  
 
3. Automated traffic flow management that will predict regions of excessive traffic 
density and complexity and compute solutions to avoid such regions. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusions stated here, are valid for the experiment conditions defined, using the 
KB3D tactical CD&R algorithm combined with the TMX P-ASAS conflict prevention 
system. This study did not include system errors and did not include full traffic density 
outside of the Fort Worth center airspace. Some problems with the experiment set up led to 
some LoS not attributable to ASAS. Enhancements to the simulation set up, KB3D and P-
ASAS should further improve performance.  
 
The conclusions from this study are: 
 
• The KB3D CD&R algorithm, using aircraft state data only, combined with the P-
ASAS conflict prevention system, effectively prevented nearly all losses of 
separation up to twice-current demand levels for the AFR-only scenario. For the 
1X AFR scenario, all conflicts were resolved without any losses of separation. 
For the 2X AFR scenario, 99.9% of conflicts were resolved with three losses of 
separation, only one of which was attributed to Tactical ASAS. 
 
• At three times the current demand level and for mixed AFR and IFR scenarios, 
the number of losses of separation increases. Even so, 99.5% of conflicts are 
resolved for the 3X AFR case, 98.9% for the 1X IFR + 1X AFR case and 99.1% 
for the 1X IFR + 2X AFR case. 
 
• For mixed AFR and IFR scenarios, some losses of separation resulted from IFR 
aircraft maneuvers that caused short-term conflicts with AFR. One solution could 
be to alert the controller to conflict-producing maneuvers by trial planning before 
requesting an IFR aircraft to maneuver. In addition, providing AFR aircraft with 
knowledge of the short-term intent of IFR aircraft may reduce the occurrence of 
controller IFR-to-AFR conflict alerts.  
 
• The conflict resolution maneuvers provided by the KB3D CD&R algorithm are 
efficient; for the 1X AFR scenario, the maneuvers result in less than 0.5% mean 
increase in flight distance compared with the unimpeded great-circle route. At 
three times the current demand level the mean increase in distance is still only 
1.8% compared to the great-circle route.  
 
• AFR aircraft can meet their RTA at the arrival fix; almost 95% are within 5 
seconds of the RTA, for the 1X AFR scenario. This degrades to 74% within 5 
seconds for the 3X AFR scenario. 
 
The reasons for many of the observed LoS are understood; others are still under 
investigation. An on-going research effort includes implementing improvements to the 
KB3D algorithm and changes to the TMX simulation code to improve performance of the 
Tactical ASAS component.  
 
With these improvements, the number of losses of separation is expected to reduce. As one 
component of a complete ASAS, tactical CD&R is part of a layered approach to separation 
assurance, and is not expected to prevent all losses of separation when used alone.  
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